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Abstract 
General purpose technologies (GPTs) are drastic innovations, such as electrification, the 
transistor, and the Internet, that are characterized by the pervasiveness in use, 
innovational complementarities, and technological dynamism. The model develops a 
two-country (Home and Foreign) dynamic general equilibrium framework and 
incorporates general purpose technology diffusion within Home that exhibits endogenous 
Schumpeterian growth. The model studies the effects of the diffusion of the general 
purpose technology on the pattern of trade and Home’s relative wage. Based on specific 
assumptions, the adoption of a GPT by a particular industry generates an increase in the 
productivity of manufacturing workers at Home. By assumption, the diffusion of a GPT 
across industries is governed by S-curve dynamics, and the diffusion of the GPT within 
an industry at Home is considered exogenous. The model analyzes the long-run and 
transitional dynamic effects of a new GPT on trade patterns, product cycles and 
(transitional) divergence in per-capita growth rates between the two countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
In any given economic “era” there are major technological innovations, such as 
electricity, the transistor, and the Internet, that have far-reaching and prolonged impact. 
These drastic innovations induce a series of secondary incremental innovations. The 
introduction of the transistor, for example, triggered a sequence of secondary innovations, 
such as the development of the integrated circuit and the microprocessor, which are also 
considered drastic innovations. These main technological innovations are used in a wide 
range of different sectors inducing further innovations. For example, microprocessors are 
now used in many everyday products like telephones, cars, personal computers, and so 
forth.  
Even though the distinction between a drastic innovation and the incremental one 
is quite important to understand the proper roles of technological innovations as engines 
of growth, economists have paid relatively less attention to the former. Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) christened these types of drastic innovations “General Purpose 
Technologies” (GPTs henceforth). A GPT is a certain type of drastic innovation which is 
characterized by the pervasiveness in use (generality of purpose), innovational 
complementarities, and inherent potential for technical improvement. 
Several empirical studies have documented the cross-industry pattern of diffusion 
for a number of GPTs.1 In addition, a strand of empirical literature has established that 
the cross-industry diffusion pattern of GPTs is similar to the diffusion process of product-
                                                 
1 For example, Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998b) provide evidence for the diffusion of 
the transistor. They state that transistors were first adopted by the hearing aids industry. 
Later, transistors were used in radios followed by the computer industry. These three 
industries are known as early adapters of the transistor GPT. The fourth sector to adopt 
the transistor was the automobile industry, followed by the telecommunication sector. 
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specific innovations and it is governed by standard S-curve dynamics.2 In other words, 
the internal-influence epidemic model can provide an empirically- relevant framework to 
analyze the dynamic effects of a GPT.3 During this diffusion process, these drastic 
innovations could generate growth fluctuations and even business cycles. 
Second, the dynamic effects of these GPTs take a long period of time to 
materialize. For instance, David (1990) argues that it may take several decades before 
major technological innovations can have significant impact on macroeconomic activity.4 
Third, these GPTs act as “engines of growth”. As a better GPT becomes available, it gets 
adopted by an increasing number of user industries and fosters complementary advances 
that raise the industry’s productivity growth. As the use of a GPT spreads throughout the 
economy, its effects become significant at the aggregate level, thus affecting overall 
productivity growth. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, 
Jorgenson (2001) documents the role of information technology in the resurgence of U.S. 
growth in the late 1990s.5 There is plenty of evidence that the rise in structural 
                                                 
2 For example, Griliches (1957) studied the diffusion of hybrid seed corn in 31 states and 
132 crop-reporting areas among farmers. His empirical model generates an S-curve 
diffusion path. Andersen (1999) confirmed the S-shaped growth path for the diffusion of 
entrepreneurial activity, using corporate and individual patents granted in the U.S. 
between 1890 and 1990. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2000) provide more evidence for an S-
shaped curve diffusion process by matching the spread of electricity with that of personal 
computer use by consumers. 
 
4 David (1990) describes a phase of twenty-five years in the case of the electric dynamo. 
He argues that the observed productivity slowdown in the earlier stage of electrification 
and computerization was due to the adjustment process associated with the adoption of a 
new GPT. 
 
5 At the aggregate level, information technology is identified with the output of 
computers, communications equipment, and software. These products appear in the GDP 
as investments by businesses, households, and governments along with net exports to the 
rest of the world. 
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productivity growth in the late 1990s can be traced to the introduction of personal 
computers and the acceleration in the price reduction of semiconductors, which 
constituted the necessary building blocks for the information technology revolution.6 
The growth effects of GPTs have been analyzed formally by Helpman and 
Trajtenberg (1998a). They emphasize the lost output that occurs because the GPT does 
not arrive ready to use but requires the invention of a set of complementary components. 
During the period when components are being developed, the new GPT will not yet be in 
use. Meanwhile the labor that is drawn into developing new components will be drawn 
out of producing final output. The result will be a fall in the overall level of output.7  
Petsas (2003) analyzes the dynamic effects of GPTs within a quality-ladders 
model of scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth. He discusses the transitional dynamics 
and the long-run equilibrium. Along the transition path, the measure of industries that 
adopt the new GPT increases, consumption per capita falls, and the interest rate rises. 
All these models use a closed economy setup that does not allow them to explain 
the effects of a drastic innovation technological innovation on international aspects of the 
economy, such as the pattern of trade, relative wages, and economic growth differences 
across countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 Another study from OECD documents that U.S. investment in information processing 
equipment and software increased from 29% in 1987 to 52% in 1999. The diffusion of 
information and communication equipment accelerated after 1995 as a new wave of 
information and communication equipment, based on applications such as the World 
Wide Web and the browser, spread rapidly throughout the economy. 
 
7 Others have pointed out a variety of additional channels though which the cost of 
adjusting to a new GPT can show up at the macroeconomic level. Greenwood and 
Yorukoglu (1997) argue that real resources are used up in learning to use the new GPT. 
Aghion and Howitt (1998b) 
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Chung (2000) examined the open-economy implications of a GPT using the 
framework developed by Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a). He showed that with the 
introduction of GPTs into the world economy, the developing countries temporarily gain 
competitiveness in marginal final good industries but end up losing those industries again 
as a sufficient number of intermediate goods for the new GPT are created in the 
developed countries. 
However, Chung’s model (2000) exhibits the scale effect property: if one 
incorporates population growth in these models, then the size of the economy (scale) 
increases exponentially over time, R&D resources grow exponentially, and so does the 
long-run growth rate of per-capita real output. 
The scale effects property is a consequence of the assumption that the growth rate 
of knowledge is directly proportional to the level of resources devoted to R&D. Jones 
(1995a) has argued that the scale effects property of earlier endogenous growth models is 
inconsistent with post-war time series evidence from all major advanced countries that 
shows an exponential increase in R&D resources and a more-or-less constant rate of per-
capita GDP growth. Jones’s criticism has stimulated the development of a new class of 
models that generate growth without scale effects.8 However, the theoretical literature on 
trade and growth without scale effects has focused either on closed economy models or 
on structurally identical economies engaging in trade with each other.9 This paper 
                                                 
point out that the process of reallocating labor from sectors using older technologies to 
those using the new GPT may involve a rise in unemployment.8 See Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1999) for more details on this issue. 
9 Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) have recently developed a two-country general 
equilibrium model of endogenous Schumpeterian (R&D based) growth without scale 
effects to examine the effect of globalization on economic growth when countries differ 
in population size and relative factor endowments. 
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develops a two-country general equilibrium framework without scale effects to determine 
the effect of the introduction of a GPT on the equilibrium relative wages and the pattern 
of trade between countries. 
 My approach borrows from Taylor’s work (1993) in that industries differ in 
production technologies. In his model, industries also differ in research technologies and 
in the set of technological opportunities available for each industry. In the presence of 
heterogeneous research technologies (captured by different productivity in R&D 
services), the pattern of R&D production and the pattern of goods production within each 
country can differ. As a result, there is a case for trade between countries in R&D 
services. The absence of heterogeneity in research technologies in my model makes the 
removal of scale effects more tractable, but eliminates the need for trade in R&D services 
between countries.  
In the present model, there are two countries that may differ in relative size: 
Home and Foreign. The population in each country grows at a common positive and 
exogenously given rate and labor is the only factor of production. There is a continuum of 
industries producing final consumption goods. Labor in each industry can be allocated 
between the two economic activities, manufacturing of high-quality goods and R&D 
services, which are used to discover new products of higher quality. As in Grossman and 
Helpman ’s (1991a) version of the quality-ladders growth model, the quality of each final 
good can be improved through endogenous innovation.  
The arrival of innovations in each industry is governed by a memoryless Poisson 
process whose intensity depends positively on R&D investments and negatively on the 
rate of difficulty of conducting R&D. In order to remove the scale effects property, I 
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consider the permanent effects of growth (PEG) specification that it has been proposed 
by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1996). According to this specification, R&D becomes 
more difficult over time and the degree of R&D difficulty is proportional to the size of 
the world market. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of the model. 
Section 3 describes the steady state equilibrium of the model and section 4 presents the 
comparative steady state results. Section 5 concludes this paper by summarizing the key 
findings and suggesting possible extensions.  
2.  The Model 
 This section develops a two-country, dynamic, general-equilibrium model with 
the following features. Each country engages in two activities: the production of final 
consumption goods and research and development. Each of the two economies is 
populated by a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[θ∈ . A single primary factor, 
labor, is used in both goods and R&D production for any industry. In each industry θ  
firms are distinguished by the quality j of the products they produce. Higher values of j 
denote higher quality and j is restricted to taking on integer values. At time 0t = , the 
state-of-the-art quality product in each industry is 0j= , that is, some firm in each 
industry knows how to produce a 0j=  quality product and no firm knows how to 
produce any higher quality product. The firm that knows how to produce the state-of-the-
art quality product in each industry is the global leader for that particular industry. At the 
same time, challengers in both countries engage in R&D to discover the next higher-
quality product that would replace the global leader in each industry. If the state-of-the-
art quality in an industry is j, then the next winner of an R&D race becomes the sole 
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global producer of a j+1 quality product. Thus, over time, products improve as 
innovations such as push each industry up its “quality ladder,” as in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a). 
 I assume for simplicity, that all firms in the global economy know how to produce 
all products that are at least one step below the state-of-the-art quality product in each 
industry. This assumption, which is standard in most quality-ladders growth models, 
prevents the incumbent monopolist from engaging in further R&D, which is standard 
assumption in most quality-ladder models. 
 For clarity, I adopt the following conventions regarding notation. Henceforth, 
superscripts “h” and “f” identify functions and variables of “Home” and Foreign” 
countries, respectively. Functions and variables without superscripts are related to the 
global economy, while functions and variables with subscripts are related to activities and 
firms within an industry. 
2.1.  Introduction and Diffusion of a New GPT 
The introduction of a new GPT and its diffusion path is modeled as follows: The 
world economy has achieved a steady-state equilibrium, manufacturing final 
consumption goods with an old GPT. I begin the analysis at time t = t0, when a new GPT 
arrives at Home unexpectedly. Firms in each industry start adopting the new GPT at an 
exogenous rate. 
  At Home, at each point in time, a fraction of industries, η, uses the new GPT and 
a fraction of industries, (1-η), does not use the new GPT. For example, if the old GPT is 
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the steam power and the new GPT is electricity, η industries use electricity in their 
production and (1-η) industries use steam power in their production.10 
I use the epidemic model to describe the diffusion of a new GPT across the 
continuum of industries.11 Its form can be described by the following differential 
equation, 
)η1(δ
η
η −=& ,                 (1) 
where tηη ∂∂=&  denotes the rate of change in the fraction of industries that use the new 
GPT and δ > 0 is the rate of diffusion. Equation (1) states that the number of new 
adoptions during the time interval dt, η& , is equal to the number of remaining potential 
adopters, (1-η), multiplied by the probability of adoption, which is the product of the 
fraction of industries that have already adopted the new GPT, η, and the parameter δ, 
which depends upon factors such as the attractiveness of the innovation and the 
frequency of adoption, both of which are assumed to be exogenous.  
                                                 
10 Devine (1983) provides an excellent historical perspective on electrification where he 
documents the transformation from shafts to wires. He states: “Until late in the nineteenth 
century, production machines were connected by a direct mechanical link to the power 
sources that drove them. In most factories, a single centrally located prime mover, such 
as a water wheel or steam engine, turned iron or steel “line shafts” via pulleys and leather 
belts….By the early 1890s then, direct current motors had become common in 
manufacturing, but were far from universal. Mechanical drive was first electrified in 
industries such as clothing and textile manufacturing and printing, where cleanliness, 
steady power and speed, and ease of control were critical”. Helpman and Trajtenberg 
(1997) explore the adoption of the transistor, an important semiconductor GPT by a 
number of industries. As they state: The early user sectors were hearing aids and 
computers. The prominent laggards were telecommunications and automobiles. These 
examples indicate that the timing of adopting a new GPT differs across industries. 
 
11 See Thirtly and Ruttan (1987, pp.77-89) for various applications of the epidemic model 
to the diffusion of technology. 
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The solution to equation (1) expresses the measure of industries that have adopted 
the new GPT as a function of time and yields the equation of the sigmoid (S-shaped) 
logistic curve: 
]e1[
1
η )tδφ( +−+= ,                (2) 
where φ  is the constant of integration. Notice that for ∞→t , equation (2) implies that 
all industries located at Home have adopted the new GPT.12 
2.2.  Household Behavior 
Let )t(Ni  be country i’s population at time t. I assume that each country’ s 
population is growing at a common constant, exogenously given rate )t(N)t(Ng iiN &=  > 
0. In each country there is a continuum of identical dynastic families that provide labor 
services in exchange for wages, and save by holding assets of firms engaged in R&D. 
Each individual member of a household is endowed with one unit of labor, which is 
inelastically supplied. I normalize the measure of families in each country at time 0 to 
equal unity. Thus, the population of workers at time t in country i is tgi Ne)t(N = . 
Each household in country i maximizes the discounted utility13 
∫ ∞ −−= 0 t)gρ( dt)t(ulogeU N ,               (3) 
                                                 
12 When −∞→t , then 0η = . If one assumes that the new GPT arrives at Home at time 
0t = , then η  > 0. That is, the new GPT arrives at Home by a given fraction of industries 
η  (i.e., the industry or industries that developed this particular GPT). 
 
13 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995 Ch.2) provide more details on this formulation of the 
household’s behavior within the context of the Ramsey model of growth. 
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where ρ  > 0 is the constant subjective discount rate. In order for U to be bounded, I 
assume that the effective discount rate is positive (i.e., Ngρ −  > 0). Expression log u(t) 
captures the per capita utility at time t, which is defined as follows: 
∫ ∑≡ 10
j
j θd)]t,θ,j(qλlog[)t(ulog .                        (4) 
In equation (4), q (j, θ, t) denotes the quantity consumed of a final product of quality j 
(i.e., the product that has experienced j quality improvements) in industry ]1,0[θ∈  at 
time t. Parameter λ > 1 measures the size of quality improvements (i.e., the size of 
innovations). 
At each point in time t, each household allocates its income to maximize (4) given 
the prevailing market prices. Solving this optimal control problem yields a unit elastic 
demand function for the product in each industry with the lowest quality-adjusted price 
)t(p
)t(N)t(c)t,θ,j(q i
ii
i = ,               (5) 
where )t(ci  is country i’s per capita consumption expenditure, and )t(p  is the market 
price of the good considered. Because goods within each industry adjusted for quality are 
by assumption identical, only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price in each 
industry is consumed. The quantity demanded of all other goods is zero. The global 
demand for a particular product is given by aggregating equation (5) across the two 
countries to obtain  
∑
=
=
f,hi
i )t,θ,j(q)t,θ,j(q .               (6) 
Given this static demand behavior, the intertemporal maximization problem of 
country i’s representative household is equivalent to  
 12
dt)t(clogemax
0
it)gρ(
)t(c
N
i ∫ ∞ −− ,               (7) 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint iN
iiii ag)t(c)t(w)t(a)t(r)t(a −−+=& , 
where )t(a i  denotes the per capita financial assets in country i, )t(w i  is the wage income 
of the representative household member in country i, and )t(r i  is country i’s 
instantaneous rate of return at time t. The solution to this maximization problem obeys 
the well-known differential equation 
ρ)t(r
)t(c
)t(c i
i
i
−=& ,                (8) 
Equation (8) implies that a constant per-capita consumption expenditure is optimal when 
the instantaneous interest rate in each country equals the consumer’s subjective discount 
rate ρ. I normalize total consumer spending to equal a constant value E at each point in 
time, and I choose for simplicity 
1E = .                  (9) 
This normalization implies that the value of output equals one at each point in time and 
combined with the differential equation for consumption expenditure per capita implies 
that the nominal interest rate r equals the subjective discount rate 
ρ)t(r =  for all t.             (10) 
2.3.  Product Markets 
In each country firms can hire labor to produce any final consumption good 
]1,0[θ∈ . Let )t,θ(Li  and )t,θ(Qiς  respectively denote the amounts of labor devoted in 
manufacturing of final consumption good θ  in country i and the output of final 
consumption good θ  in country i produced with the aid of the { }1,0ς∈  GPT. Then the 
 13
production function of the final consumption good θ  in country i is given by the 
following equation 
ς
i
Q
i
i
ς γ)θ(α
)t,θ(L)t,θ(Q = ,             (11) 
where )θ(α iQ  is the unit labor requirement associated with the final consumption good θ  
in country i and ςγ  captures the productivity gains associated with the new GPT and 
equals to  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∈∀=
∈∀==
]1,η[θ1γ
]η,0[θ1γγ
γ
0
1
ς
p
.            (12) 
I assume that each vertically differentiated good must be manufactured in the 
country in which the most recent product improvement has taken place. That is, I rule out 
international licensing and multinational corporations.14 
 Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), the relative labor unit requirement for each 
good θ  is given by  
)θ(α
)θ(α
)θ(A h
Q
f
Q≡   )θ(A′  < 0          (A.1) 
The relative unit labor requirement function in (A.1) is by assumption continuous, and 
decreasing in θ .  
The assumptions that goods within an industry are identical when adjusted for 
quality and Bertrand price competition in product markets imply that the monopolist in 
                                                 
14 Taylor (1993) incorporates multinational corporations in a model of endogenous 
growth and trade. In his model, innovations are always implemented on front line 
production technologies (i.e, that is technologies that are minimum cost given the 
prevailing wage rates) and when innovation and implementation occur at different 
countries, the resulting transactions are considered as imports and exports of R&D. 
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each industry engages in limit pricing. The assumption that the technology of all inferior 
quality products is public knowledge imply that the quality leader charges a single price, 
which is λ  times the lowest manufacturing cost between the two countries: 
{ }ffQhhQ w)θ(α,w)θ(αminλp = .            (13) 
I assume that if for any industry θ , its manufacturing unit cost is lower in Foreign than in 
Home, )θ(αw fQ
f  < )θ(αw hQ
h , then )θ(αw fQ
f  < γ)θ(αw hQ
h  also holds. 
I also assume that the wage of home labor, hw , is greater than the wage of foreign labor, 
fw . That is, the home relative wage, ω , is greater than one15 
f
h
w
w
ω =  > 1.                (14) 
The last two assumptions imply that the price of every top quality good is equal to 
ff
Q w)θ(λαp = .               (15) 
It follows that the stream of profits of the incumbent monopolist that uses the { }1,0ς∈  
GPT and produces the state-of-the-art quality product in Home will be equal to 
)t(N
)θ(λα
γ)θ(ωα
1q]γ)θ(aw)θ(αwλ[)t,θ(π f
Q
ς
h
Q
ς
h
Q
hf
Q
fh
ς ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−= ,         (16) 
while the stream of profits of the incumbent monopolist that produces the state-of-the-art 
quality product in Foreign will be equal to 
)t(N
λ
)1λ(q)]θ(aw)θ(λα[)t,θ(π fQ
ff
Q
f −=−= ,          (17) 
where )]t(N)t(N[)t(N fh +=  is the size of world population and the world expenditure 
on final consumption goods.  
                                                 
15 In proposition 1 I provide sufficient conditions under which this assumption holds. 
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2.4.  R&D Races 
Labor is the only input engaged in R&D in any industry ]1,0[θ∈ . Let )t,θ(LiR  
and )t,θ(R i  respectively denote the amounts of labor devoted in R&D services in 
industry θ  in country i and the output of R&D services in industry θ  in country i. The 
production function of R&D services in industry θ  in country i exhibits constant returns 
and is given by the following equation16 
R
i
Ri
α
)t,θ(L)t,θ(R = ,                         (18) 
where Rα  is the unit labor requirement in the production of R&D services. Note that the 
absence of a superscript and the absence of the industry index θ  in the unit labor 
requirement imply that they are the same across countries, industries and goods of 
different quality levels. The absence of heterogeneous research technologies allows me to 
focus on the implications of assumption (A.1) on the properties of the model.17 
 In each industry θ  there are global, sequential and stochastic R&D races that 
result in the discovery of higher-quality final products. A challenger firm k that is located 
in country }{ f,hi ∈ targeting a quality leader in country }{ f,hi ∈  engages in R&D in 
                                                 
16 The empirical evidence on returns to scale of R&D expenditure is inconclusive. 
Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) among others developed a model where they allow for 
diminishing returns to R&D effort at the firm level and industry leaders have R&D cost 
advantages over follower firms. In their model, when there are diminishing returns to 
R&D and the government does not intervene both industry leaders and follower firms 
invest in R&D. 
 
17 Taylor (1993) has introduced heterogeneity in the research technologies and in the 
technological opportunity for improvements in technologies. The presence of 
heterogeneous research technologies makes trade in R&D services between countries 
possible. The absence of heterogeneous research technologies in the present model, 
makes the removal of scale effects more tractable, but eliminates the possibility of trade 
in R&D services between the two countries. 
 16
industry θ  and discovers the next higher-quality product with instantaneous probability 
dt)t,(Iik θ , where dt is an infinitesimal interval of time and 
)t(X
)t,θ(R)t,θ(I
i
ki
k = ,              (19) 
where )t,θ(R ik  denotes firm k’s R&D outlays and X(t) captures the difficulty of R&D in 
industry θ  at time t. I assume that the returns to R&D investments are independently 
distributed across challengers, countries, industries, and over time. Therefore, the 
industry-wide probability of innovation can be obtained from equation (19) by summing 
up the levels of R&D across all challengers in that country. That is, 
∑ ==
k
i
i
k
i
)t(X
)t,θ(R)t,θ(I)t,θ(I ,            (20) 
where )t,θ(R i  denotes total R&D services in industry θ  in country i. Variable Ii(θ, t) is 
the effective R&D.18 The arrival of innovations in each industry follows a memoryless 
Poisson process with intensity ∑=
i
i )t(X)t,θ(R)t,θ(I which equals the global rate of 
innovation in a typical industry. The function X(t) has been introduced in the endogenous 
growth literature after Jone’s (1995a) empirical criticism of R&D based growth models 
generating scale effects. 
                                                 
18 The variable )t,θ(I i is the intensity of the Poisson process that governs the arrivals of 
innovations in industry θ in country i. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) model the 
strategic interactions between a typical incumbent and its challengers as a differential 
game for Poisson jump processes and derive the equilibrium conditions that govern the 
solution to a typical R&D contest. They also provide an informal and intuitive derivation 
of these conditions. In the present model, I follow their informal derivation to derive my 
results.  
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A recent body of theoretical literature has developed models of Schumpeterian 
growth without scale effects.19 Two alternative specifications have offered possible 
solutions to the scale-effects property. The first specification proposed by Dinopoulos 
and Thompson (1996) removes the scale-effects property by assuming that the level of 
R&D difficulty is proportional to the market size measured by the level of population, 
X(t) = kN(t),               (21) 
where k > 0 is a parameter. 
This specification captures the notion that it is more difficult to introduce new 
products and replace old ones in a larger market. The model that results form this 
specification is called the permanent effects of growth (PEG) model because policies 
such as an R&D subsidy and tariffs can alter the per-capita long-run growth rate.20 
Consider now the stock-market valuation of temporary monopoly profits. 
Consumer savings are channeled to firms engaging in R&D through the stock market. 
The assumption of a continuum of industries allows consumers to diversify the industry-
specific risk completely and earn the market interest rate. At each instant in time, each 
challenger issues a flow of securities that promise to pay the flow of monopoly profits if 
the firm wins the R&D race and zero otherwise.21 Consider now the stock-market 
valuation of the incumbent firm in each industry. Let )t(Viς  denote the expected global 
discounted profits of a successful innovator at time t in country i, when the global 
                                                 
19 See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) for an overview of these models. 
 
20 Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) provide micro foundations for this specification in 
the context of a model with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. 
 
21 If the monopolist is located in Home, the monopoly profits are define by equation (16) 
and if the monopolist is located in Foreign, the monopoly profits are defined by equation 
(17). 
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monopolist uses the { }1,0ς∈  GPT and charges a price p for the state-of-the-art quality 
product. Because each global quality leader is targeted by challengers from both 
countries who engage in R&D to discover the next higher-quality product, a shareholder 
faces a capital loss )t(Viς  if further innovation occurs. The event that the next innovation 
will arrive occurs with instantaneous probability Idt, whereas the event that no innovation 
will arrive occurs with instantaneous probability 1-Idt. Over a time interval dt, the 
shareholder of an incumbent’s stock receives a dividend π(t)dt and the value of the 
incumbent appreciates by dt)t(Vdt]t)t(V[)t(dV iς
i
ς
i
ς
&=∂∂= . Perfect international capital 
mobility implies that rrr fh == . The absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities 
requires the expected rate of return on stock issued by a successful innovator to be equal 
to the riskless rate of return r; that is,  
rdtdt)t,θ(I
)t,θ(V
]0)t,θ(V[
dt
)t,θ(V
)t,θ(π
dt]dt)t,θ(I1[
)t,θ(V
)t,θ(V
i
ς
i
ς
i
ς
i
ς
i
ς
i
ς =−−+−
&
.       (22) 
Taking limits in equation (22) as 0dt →  and rearranging terms appropriately gives the 
following expression for the value of monopoly profits 
)t,θ(V
)t,θ(V
)t,θ(Iρ
)t,θ(π
)t,θ(V
i
ς
i
ς
i
ςi
ς &
−+
= .            (23) 
A typical challenger k located in country i chooses the level of R&D investment 
)t,θ(R ik  to maximize the expected discounted profits 
dt)t,θ(Rαwdt
)t(X
)t,θ(R)t,θ(V ikR
i
i
ki
ς − ,           (24) 
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where dt])t(X)t,(R[dtI ik
i
k θ=  is the instantaneous probability of discovering the next 
higher-quality product and )t,θ(Rαw ikR
i  is the R&D cost of challenger k located in 
country i. 
Free entry into each R&D race drives the expected discounted profits of each 
challenger down to zero and yields the following zero profit condition: 
)t(Xαw)t(V R
ii
ς = .              (25) 
The pattern of R&D production across the two countries can be determined by 
utilizing equations (23) and (25). Combining these equations and evaluating them at the 
margin  I can obtain the R&D schedule (i.e., the schedule of relative labor productivities 
in goods) as follows  
ς
h
Q
f
Q
γ)θ~(α
)θ~(α
)θ~(RDω == ,             (26) 
where )θ~(RD is continuous and decreasing in θ~ . For low values of θ , Home has higher 
relative labor productivity than Foreign, and thus it earns higher wage. Therefore, Home 
has comparative advantage in producing and conducting R&D the final goods with lower 
θ  and Foreign has comparative advantage in producing and conducting R&D the final 
goods with higher θ . The R&D schedule can be depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Lemma 1:  Under assumption (A.1) and for any given value of the relative wage, 
( ))0()0(),1()1( hQfQhQfQ ααααω∈ , there exists an industry θ~  defined by equation (26) 
such that 
(a) firms are indifferent between conducting R&D in Foreign or in Home, 
(b) for each industry ]~,0[ θθ ∈ , only Home conducts R&D, 
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(c) for each industry ]1,~[θθ ∈ , only Foreign conducts R&D. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
One can find the results from Lemma 1 in Dornbusch et al. (1977). However, the 
derivation of Lemma 1 differs between the present model and the one in Dornbusch et al. 
(1977). In their model, the results from Lemma 1 come from the assumption of perfect 
competition in all markets. In the present model, the intuition behind Lemma 1 results 
from the zero profit conditions regarding R&D. If in industry θ , R&D is undertaken by 
Home, then the zero profit conditions for R&D imply that Foreign has negative profits in 
this particular industry (see equations (23) and (25)). Thus, for all industries that Home 
undertakes R&D, Foreign has negative profits and does not engage in R&D in these 
industries. The reverse is true for those industries that Foreign undertakes R&D. Home 
has negative profits in these industries, so it does not engage in R&D in those industries. 
Thus, both countries sustain their comparative advantage. 
2.5.  Labor Markets 
Consider first the Home labor market. All workers are employed by firms in 
either production or R&D activities. Taking into account that each industry leader 
charges the same price p and that consumers only buy goods from industry leaders in 
equilibrium, it follows from (11) that employment of labor in the production of goods 
using the new GPT in Home is θdγα)t,θ(Q
η
0
h
Q
h∫ , while employment of labor in the 
production of goods using the old GPT is θdα)t,θ(Q
θ
~
η
h
Q
h∫  . Solving equation (18) for 
each industry leader’s R&D employment )t,θ(LhR  and then integrating across industries, 
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total R&D employment by industry leaders in the home country is θdα)t,θ(R R
θ
~
0
h∫ . 
Thus, the full employment of labor condition for the home country at time t is given by 
∫∫∫ ++= θ~0 Rhθ
~
η
h
Q
hη
0
h
Q
hh θdα)t,θ(Rθdα)t,θ(Qθdγ)θ(α)t,θ(Q)t(N .       (27) 
The full employment of labor condition for the foreign country at time t is given by 
∫∫ += 1θ~ Rf1θ~ fQff θdα)t,θ(Rθd)θ(α)t,θ(Q)t(N .          (28) 
Equations (27) and (28) complete the description of the model. 
3.  Steady-State Equilibrium 
In this section I derive the steady-state equilibrium.Assuming that the relative 
wage, ω , is constant over time at the steady-state equilibrium, equation (25) implies that 
N
i
ς
i
ς g)t(X)t(X)t,θ(V)t,θ(V == && . That is, the expected global discounted profits of a 
successful innovator at time t in country i, )t(Viς , and the level of R&D difficulty, X(t), 
grow at the constant rate of population growth, Ng . Combining equations (23) and (25) 
after taking into account equations (16) and (17), I obtain the following zero profit 
conditions for Home and Foreign respectively for each industry: 
kαw
g)t,θ(Iρ
)θ(λα
γ)θ(ωα
1
R
h
N
f
Q
h
Q
=−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
    ]η,0[θ∈∀         (29) 
kαw
g)t,θ(Iρ
)θ(λα
)θ(ωα
1
R
h
N
f
Q
h
Q
=−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
    ]θ~,η[θ∈∀         (30) 
kαw
g)t(Iρ
λ
)1λ(
R
f
N
=−+
−
.    ]1,θ~[θ∈∀         (31) 
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Utilizing equations (29)-(31), one can rank the level of global R&D investment 
between Home and Foreign. Notice that the level of global R&D investment, I, does not 
depend on θ  for ]1,θ~[θ∈ . On contrast, the level of global R&D investment, I, depends 
on θ  for ]θ~,0[θ∈ . As Home conducts R&D in more industries, the level of global R&D 
investment increases.  
Integrating equation (29) over ]η,0[ , equation (30) over ]θ~,η[ , and equation (31) 
over ]1,θ~[  I obtain the following zero profit conditions for Home and Foreign, 
respectively at the economy-wide level: 
η]g)t,θ(Iρ[kωαwθd
)θ(α
)θ(α
λ
ωγ
η NR
hη
0 f
Q
h
Q −+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − ∫           (32) 
)ηθ~](g)t,θ(Iρ[kωαwθd
)θ(α
)θ(α
λ
ω
ηθ
~
NR
hθ
~
η f
Q
h
Q −−+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −− ∫          (33) 
]g)t,θ(Iρ[kαw
λ
)1λ(
NR
f −+=− ,            (34) 
Substitution of equations (5) and (13) into the first integral of equation (27) yields the 
demand for manufacturing labor in Home 
θd
)θ(α
)θ(α
wλ
)t(Nγ η
0 f
Q
h
Q
f ∫ .              (35) 
Combining equations (18), (20), and (21), one can obtain the demand for R&D labor in 
Home 
θd)t,θ(Iα)t(kN
θ
~
0
h
R ∫ .             (36) 
Given that there is a large number of independent industries, the law of large numbers 
implies that the integral in equation (33) can be written as follows: 
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)t(Iθ~θd)t,θ(I
θ
~
0
=∫ .              (37) 
where ∫= 10 θd)t,θ(I)t(I  is the average “effective-R&D” of the world economy. 
Substituting equations (35) and (37) (after taking into account equation (34)) into 
Home’s full employment of labor condition (equation 27) yields the resource condition 
)t(Iθ~αkθd
)θ(α
)θ(α
θd
)θ(α
)θ(α
γ
wλ
1)t(N R
θ
~
η f
Q
h
Qη
0 f
Q
h
Q
f
h +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫∫ ,         (38) 
where )t(N)t(N)t(N hh ≡  is Home’s population size relative to the world population 
size. 
Similar substitutions yield the resource condition for the foreign country: 
)t(I)θ~1(αk
wλ
)θ~1()t(N Rf
f −+−= ,            (39) 
where )t(N)t(N)t(N ff ≡  is the foreign country’s population relative to the world 
population. 
The above resource conditions described by equations (38) and (39) hold at each 
instant in time because, by assumption, factor markets clear instantaneously in both 
countries. 
Equations (32), (33), (34), (38), and (39) represent a system of four equations in 
four unknowns θ~ , hw , fw , and I.. Manipulating these four equations yields a second 
schedule in ( )ω,θ  space, the mutual resource schedule22 
                                                 
22 In Appendix D, I derive the mutual resource schedule and show that it is upward-
sloping in )ω,θ(  space. 
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⎞
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⎛ −+−==  .          (40) 
The mutual resource schedule states that the relative wage ω , which clears labor 
markets in both countries, is an increasing function of the range of goods θ~  produced in 
Home. If the range of goods produced by Home increases, Home’s relative demand for 
labor (both in manufacturing and R&D) increases. The excess demand for labor drives 
the level of the relative wage higher. 
The mutual resource condition (MR) can be depicted in Figure 5.1. The vertical 
axis measures the home country’s relative wage, ω , and the horizontal axis reflects the 
measure of industries, θ . The intersection of the downward sloping RD( θ~ ) schedule and 
the upward sloping MR( θ~ ) schedule at point E determines the steady-state equilibrium 
relative wage, ω , and the marginal industry θ~  in which both countries undertake 
production in goods and R&D services.23 
Therefore, I arrive at: 
Proposition 1:  For sufficiently large hf NN , there exists a unique steady-state 
equilibrium such that 
(a) Home’s relative wage, ω , is greater than one, 
(b) Home has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries 
]~,0[ θθ ∈ . In each industry ]~,0[ θθ ∈ , only Home conducts R&D, produces, and 
exports the state of the-art product, 
                                                 
23 For sufficiently large hf NN , the )θ~(MR  schedule intersects the )θ~(RD  schedule at 
a point above the 45º line, such as ω  > 1. 
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(c) Foreign has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries 
]1,~[θθ ∈ . In each industry ]1,~[θθ ∈ , only Foreign conducts R&D, produces, and 
exports the state of the-art product. 
(d) Home uses the new GPT in the range of industries ]η,0[θ∈  and uses the old GPT 
in the range of industries ]θ~,η[θ∈  
Proof.  See Appendix. 
The results from this proposition can be found in other models. The static 
continuum Ricardian model developed by Dornbusch et al. (1977) and the dynamic 
learning-by-doing model introduced by Krugman (1987) produce similar features with 
the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 illustrates the steady-state equilibrium in the presence of the new GPT. 
The pattern of trade in goods is determined by comparative advantage across industries. 
In addition and in contrast to earlier work, the model predicts that the pattern of trade is 
determined by additional factors such as population growth and the R&D difficulty 
parameter. Moreover, the absence of heterogeneity in research technologies results in no 
trade in R&D services. Taylor (1993), has introduced heterogeneity in research 
technologies and result in an equilibrium with trade in R&D services. Finally, factor price 
equalization is not a property of the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Proposition 2:  If η is governed by S-curve dynamics, there are two steady-state 
equilibria: the initial steady-state equilibrium arises before the adoption of the new GPT, 
where η = 0, and the final steady-state equilibrium is reached after the diffusion process 
of the new GPT has been completed, where η = 1. At the final steady-state equilibrium: 
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Home produces, conducts R&D, and exports more goods, )1(θ~ > )0(θ~ , Home’s relative 
wage is higher, ω (1) > ω (0) 
Proof.  See Appendix 
These comparative steady-state properties can be illustrated with the help of 
Figure 2. Before the introduction of the new GPT in Home, the world economy is in a 
steady state (point A) where 0η = , with Home exporting the range of goods )0(θ~ , and 
with its relative wage given by )0(ω . The new GPT arrives in the world economy at time 
t = 0 with a given measure of industries η  > 0. Thus, at time t = 0, a portion of the RD 
schedule jumps upward for those industries that are using the new GPT, since these 
industries are now more productive due to new GPT. An increase in the measure of 
industries that adopt the new GPT makes the RD schedule in Figure 2 shift upward from 
RD (where 0η = ) to RD′ (where 1η = ) resulting in higher relative wage and in higher 
comparative advantage for Home. In other words, when all industries at Home have 
adopted the new GPT, final goods producers in Home gain competitiveness. The new 
steady state is at point B, where 1η = , with Home exporting the range of goods )1(θ~ , and 
with its relative wage given by )1(ω . 
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Figure 1:  Steady-State Equilibrium Before the Introduction of the new GPT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.2:  Steady-State Equilibria 
Point A: No industry has adopted the new GPT 
Point B: All industries have adopted the new GPT. 
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4.  Transitional Dynamics 
In this section I analyze the transitional dynamics of the model. The equation that 
governs the GPT diffusion (1) together with equations (20) and (22) (which hold at each 
instant of time) enable me to construct a system of two differential equations that govern 
the evolution of θ~  and η . By proper substitutions, I obtain: 
kαw
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Integrating equations (41)-(43), I obtain: 
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Manipulating equations (44) and (45), yields: 
∫∫ −= η0 f
Q
h
Qθ
~
η f
Q
h
Q θd
)θ(α
)θ(α
η
γ)ηθ~(
θd
)θ(α
)θ(α
            (47) 
Taking logs and differentiate in equation (47) yields: 
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η
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Q
h
Q
2 dy)y(α
)y(α
)η,θ~(A  
Equations (48) and (1) determine the evolution of the two endogenous variables 
of the model, the range of goods Home exports, θ~ , and the number of industries at Home 
that have adopted the new GPT, η. 
Equation (48) is equal to zero, when η = 1, or when the following condition is 
satisfied: 
( ) 0θ~)η(α)η,θ~(A)η(A))η,θ~(A)η(A)(ηθ~)(η(ηα fQ2121hQ =−+−        (49) 
By totally differentiating equation (49), after rearranging I obtain ηdθ~d  < 0. 
Thus, 0θ =&  defines a downward-sloping curve in Figure 5.3. Starting from any 
point on this curve, an increase in η leads to θ~&  > 0 and a decrease in η leads to θ~&  < 0. 
The right-hand side of equation (1) is independent of θ~ , and therefore the 0η =&  locus is 
a vertical line. Starting from any point on this line, decrease in η leads to η&  > 0. The area 
to the left of the vertical line (i.e., locus 0η =& ) identifies a region in which the potential 
number of adopters is greater than one. Therefore, this region is not feasible. There exists 
a downward-sloping saddle path going through the balanced-growth equilibrium point B. 
Thus, I arrive at:   
Proposition 3.  Assume that θ~)1(θ~ ∂∂ &  < -δ . Then, there exists a negative-sloping 
globally stable-saddle-path going through the final balanced-growth equilibrium point B. 
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Along the saddle path, the measure of industries that adopt the new GPT, η, increases, 
the relative wage, ω, increases, and the market interest rate, r, is equal to the subjective 
discount rate,ρ,.                             
Proof.  See Appendix. 
The analysis is predicated on the assumption of perfect foresight.24 When the new 
GPT arrives, the range of goods Home exports, θ~ , jumps upward instantaneously to θ~′  
(point A′  in Figure 3). This jump increases Home’s relative wage since there is more 
intense competition for workers at Home in order to produce more goods. The higher 
values of θ~  and ω  lower the discounted expected monopoly profits at Home (see 
assumption (A.1) and equations (41)-(43)) and raise the discounted expected monopoly 
profits at Foreign. As I result, Foreign starts engaging in more R&D and gains back its 
competitiveness in both R&D and production. During the transition dynamics (i.e., as the 
equilibrium moves from point A′  to point B in Figure 3), the range of goods Home 
exports, θ~ , decreases, and the relative wage decreases to adjust the equilibrium in Home 
and Foreign labor markets. At point B in Figure 2, all industries at Home have adopted 
the new GPT. 
                                                 
24 There also exists a degenerate equilibrium where the adoption of the new GPT is not 
completed. Suppose that when a new GPT arrives, every potential producer expects that 
no one will produce more goods. As a result, it does not pay to increase production, 
because the new GPT will never be fully adopted. In this event, the pessimistic 
expectations are self-fulfilling, and no new GPTs are fully adopted. I do not discuss these 
types of equilibria in what follows. 
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Figure 3:  Stability of the Balanced-Growth Equilibrium 
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5.  Conclusions 
The previous literature on “quality ladders” framework that analyzed Ricardian 
models of trade exhibits the scale effects property. In this paper, I have developed a 
model of trade based on “quality-ladders” growth without scale effects to analyze how 
GPTs affect the pattern of trade and the relative wage are determined in steady-state 
equilibrium. The absence of scale effects generates novel and interesting results. 
Given the relatively simplicity of the model, this dynamic formulation provides a 
useful framework to examine other issues. For example, the introduction of trade 
instruments and their effect on the pattern of trade between countries can be examined 
under the two alternative models. Alternatively, a North-South model of trade might yield 
interesting implications. 
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